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A LEGAL AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF
THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE
SCHEDULING FORMAT: MOST TEAMS
CAN'T WIN FOR LOSIN'
by Ethan Lock * and J Michael Gratz**
I. INTRODUCTION
Restraints of trade challenged under the antitrust laws are evalu-
ated under one of two standards: the per se standard, or the rule of
reason standard.' In the context of professional sports, the question of
which standard is most appropriate has been addressed in cases involv-
ing antitrust attacks upon player restraints.2 This article analyzes the
National Football League Player Draft under both standards. A sub-
stantial portion of the analysis is devoted to a discussion of the factors
relevant to the determination of reasonableness under the rule of rea-
son. Included in this discussion is a statistical analysis of the NFL
scheduling mechanism and its significance to the determination of
reasonableness.
Brief explanations of the per se standard and the rule of reason
standard are presented in section II. Section III discusses the applica-
tion of the per se standard to the NFL draft. This section points out
Assistant Professor of Business Law, Arizona State University.
Doctoral Candidate, Quantitative Systems Department, Arizona State University.
1. There are numerous legal commentaries dealing generally with the per se and rule of
reason standards. See, e.g., E. Gellhorn, Antitrust Law and Economics in a Nutshell, chps.
5-6 (1976); Bork, The Rule ofReason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Divi-
sion, Parts I & II, 74 Yale L.J. 775 (1965); 75 Yale L.J. 373 (1966); J. von Kalinowski,
Antitrust Laws and Trade Regulations §§ 6.01-.02 (1971) [hereinafter cited as von Kalinow-
ski]; Barber, Refusals to Deal Under the FederalAntitrust Law, 103 U. Pa. L. Rev. 847 (1955);
Handler, Recent Developments in Antitrust Laws. 1958-59, 59 Colum. L. Rev. 843 (1959);
von Kalinowski, The Per Se Doctrine-An Emerging Philosophy of Antitrust Law, I 1 UCLA
L. Rev. 569 (1964); Van Cise, The Future of Per Se in Antitrust Law, 50 Va. L. Rev. 1165
(1964); Note, Trade Association Exclusionary Practices. An Afmative Rolefor the Rule of
Reason, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 1486 (1966). Cited from J. Weistart and C. Lowell, The Law of
Sports 592, footnote 644 (1979).
2. See, e.g., Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976); Mackey v.
National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), modfy'ing 407 F. Supp. 1000 (D.
Minn. 1975) (Rozelle Rule); Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (draft, reserve clause, uniform player contract); Kapp v. National Football
League, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (Rozelle Rule, tampering rule).
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both the similarities and differences between the NFL draft and those
restraints that have been characterized as per se violations of the anti-
trust laws.
Application of the rule of reason requires the court to consider the
reasonableness of the restraint being scrutinized. 3 Thus, those courts
that have analyzed the player restraints under the rule of reason have
also discussed some of the factors that are relevant to the determination
of reasonableness.' Section IV explains the rationale for analyzing the
draft under the rule of reason and discusses the factors that are relevant
to the determination of the draft's reasonableness under that standard.
These factors include the purpose of the draft, its effects,' whether it
produces economic procompetitive benefits,6 and the existence of less
restrictive alternatives to achieve the draft's stated purpose of promot-
ing competitive balance."
The NFL's current scheduling format, like its player draft system,
is allegedly designed to promote competitive balance.8 As a mecha-
nism to help the League achieve competitive balance, scheduling is im-
portant because it is less restrictive than the draft.' Section V
summarizes the results of a statistical study conducted to determine the
actual impact of scheduling on competitive balance. The study also
compares the effects of scheduling prior to and since the adoption of
the current format.
From the standpoint of player salaries and player mobility, sched-
uling is less restrictive and, thus, less objectionable under the antitrust
laws than the draft. Given other constraints and other objectives that
the League hopes to achieve from scheduling, it should adopt a format
that will have as large an impact on competitive balance as possible.
An alternative scheduling format, designed to have a greater impact on
competitive balance than the present format, is presented in Appendix
A.
3. See supra note 1. See also Chicago Board of Trade v. United States 246 U.S. 231,
238 (1918); J. Weistart and C. Lowell, The Law of Sports 592-93, 595 (1979). [Hereinafter
cited as Weistart.]
4. See, e.g., Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976); Mackey v.
National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), modifying 407 F. Supp. 1000 (D.
Minn. 1975).
5. Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
6. National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
7. Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 738, 746 (D.D.C. 1976), afd, 593 F.2d
1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
8. National Football League 1981 Media Information Book.




II. DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE PER SE AND
RULE OF REASON STANDARDS
The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 condemns "every" contract,
combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade.'° The Supreme Court,
however, has recognized that there are some situations in which the
nature of the industry or restraint in question justifies joint action
among firms." Thus, the Court has ruled that the Act was intended to
prohibit only unreasonable restraints.' 2 This interpretation has led to
the evolution of two standards under which courts scrutinize restraints
of trade; the per se standard and the rule of reason standard.
The per se standard is extremely rigid. 3 Under this standard, cer-
tain types of restraints which are considered to have a harmful effect on
competition are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and, thus,
unlawful.' 4 Application of the per se standard precludes any inquiry
into the reasonableness of the restraint.' 5 Further, the standard is ap-
propriate only when there has been sufficient experience with the busi-
ness relationships being scrutinized to warrant a general conclusion of
unreasonableness.' 6 Group boycotts," price fixing agreements,' 8 and
10. "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby
declared to be illegal ..... Sherman Antitrust Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970) (hereinafter
"Act").
11. See, e.g., Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 292 (1963); Mackey v. Na-
tional Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. United States Trotting
Ass'n, 1960 Trade Cas. § 69, 761 (S.D. Ohio). See also Comment, Trade Association Exclu-
sionary Practices: An Affirmative Rolefor the Rule ofReason, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 1486 (1966).
Cited from Weistart supra note 3, at 691 n.75.
12. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. I (1911); United States v.
American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911); Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246
U.S. 231 (1918).
13. Certain types of restraints, because of their anticompetitive effect and lack of re-
deeming virtues, are regarded as so inherently anticompetitive that they are struck down
without consideration of their motives, purpose, or effect. See, e.g., Northern Pacific Ry. v.
United States 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
14. Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
15. See, e.g., Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1; Silver v. New York Stock
Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963); White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963);
Kapp v. National Football League, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Blalock v. Ladies
Professional Golf Ass'n., 359 F. Supp. 1260 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Denver Rockets v. AU-Pro
Management, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
16. United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607 (1972); Weistart, supra
note 3, at 593 (1979).
17. See, e.g., Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Fashion Origi-
nators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
18. See, e.g., United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Boards, 339 U.S. 485 (1950).
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the division of markets among competitors 9 are examples of restraints
that are conclusively presumed to have a harmful effect on competition.
Thus, unless the Court is faced with a novel or unique business situa-
tion or industry,2" restraints of this nature are per se illegal.
The rule of reason, on the other hand, is more flexible.2 Under
this standard, a restraint is lawful if it is reasonable and unlawful if it is
unreasonable.22 The determination of reasonableness is based upon a
thorough examination of the nature and needs of the business or indus-
try and the purpose and effect of the restraint being scrutinized.23 Ap-
plication of the rule of reason can be time consuming and expensive
and often places an enormous burden on the plaintiff.24 Nonetheless,
this type of inquiry is appropriate where the court lacks sufficient expe-
rience with the restraint or industry in question,25 or where the particu-
lar industry or restraint being scrutinized is unique.26
III. APPLICATION OF THE PER SE STANDARD TO THE NFL DRAFT
A threshhold question in any antitrust challenge to the NFL
player draft is whether the draft should be characterized as a per se
19. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); Timken Roller
Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
20. In situations where there is a novel or unique business or restraint, courts will apply
the rule of reason. See infra notes 24, 25.
21. The rule of reason applies where the restraint although anticompetitive, has certain
redeeming features which save it from being conclusively presumed unreasonable. See, e.g.,
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States 221 U.S. I (1911) (adoption of rule of
reason).
22. See supra note 2.
23. Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
24. Weistart, supra note 3, at 593.
25. Extensive economic inquiry is often unnecessary because prior cases have estab-
lished that the particular restraint will ultimately be found to be unreasonable. Thus, cer-
tain restraints are deemed per se unreasonable. See Northern Pacic Ry., 356 U.S. at 5. This
suggests that it is appropriate for courts to gain experience with unusual types of restraints
by making the more detailed inquiry under the rule of reason. See Van Cise, The Future of
Per Se in Antitrust Law, 50 Va. L. Rev. 1165, 1174-75 (1964). Cited from Weistart, supra
note 3, at 618. A concern for the lack of information about the structure of a previously
unexplored industry was also the basis for the court's refusal to apply the per se standard in
Worthern Bank & Trust Co. v. National Bank Americard, Inc., 485 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918 (1974). Cited from Weistart, supra note 3, at 619.
26. Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 619: "In similar circumstances,
when faced with a unique or novel business situation, courts have eschewed a per se analysis
in favor of an inquiry into the reasonableness of the restraint under the circumstances." See
also Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925); Chastain v. Ameri-
can Tel. & Tel. Co., 401 F. Supp. 151 (D.D.C. 1975); Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v. National
BankAmericard, Inc., 485 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918 (1974); United
States v. First Nat'l Pictures, Inc., 282 U.S. 44 (1930).
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violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. On the one hand, the ama-
teur player draft systems employed by professional sports leagues are
analogous to those types of restraints that are per se illegal. For exam-
ple, through the NFL draft, the teams in the League essentially agree to
divide the market for new players.27 Because of this agreement, it has
been suggested that the draft resembles a horizontal division of the
market for new playing talent.2" In addition, the agreement among the
teams not to compete with each other for players selected in the draft
effectively reduces the salaries of drafted players. Thus, the draft sys-
tem has also been compared to a price fixing scheme.29 Finally, drafted
players are effectively boycotted by all but one team, because each
team agrees to deal only with the players it drafts.30 As a result, the
draft has been described as a "group boycott in its classic and most
pernicious form."'"
Despite these similarities, there are significant differences between
the draft and those types of restraints that have been characterized as
per se violations of the Sherman Act. For example, the cases in which
group boycotts have been conclusively presumed illegal32 have in-
volved agreements among horizontal competitors to boycott a horizon-
tal competitor not a party to the agreement. 3 The draft differs from
the agreements in these cases in three ways.
Perhaps the most significant difference is the fact that the teams in
27. See National Football League Collective Bargaining Agreement Article XIlII, § 4
(1977), granting each team the exclusive right to negotiate with each player it selects in the
draft.
28. See Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867, 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1975),
(involving the NBA player draft and other restraints similar to those employed by the NFL);
Weistart, supra note 3, at 594.
29. Id.
30. See National Football League Collective Bargaining Agreement Article XIII, § 4
(1977), agreement among teams to respect the exclusive draft rights of every other team.
31. See Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 738, 744-45 (D.D.C. 1976), citing
White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963). The court cited White for the propo-
sition that concerted refusals to deal constitute group boycotts and are therefore per se ille-
gal. See also Mackey v. National Football League, 407 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Minn. 1975),
modified, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976); Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp.
867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Kapp v. National Football League, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
32. See, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966); Radiant Burn-
ers, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-
Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457
(1941).
33. Id. "Horizontal restraint" denotes restraint on the same level in the market struc-
ture, for example, manufacturer to manufacturer or owner to owner, whereas "vertical re-
straint" denotes restraint on different levels in the market structure, for instance,
manufacturer to distributor or owner to player. See United States v. Topco Assocs. 405 U.S.
596, 608 (1972).
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the NFL are not horizontal business competitors in the traditional
sense.34 In most business settings, firms compete with each other for
market shares. Each firm attempts to sell as much of its product as it
can, regardless of the impact of its success on other firms. Firms in
professional sports leagues do not compete in this manner. Teams op-
erate jointly to produce football games and telecasts. No NFL team
can produce this product without the cooperation and joint action of
every other team." In this respect, the teams more closely resemble
joint venturers than business competitors.36 In fact, there is authority
to suggest that the proper classification for a sports league is that of a
single firm attempting to exploit a national market.37
Second, the draft does not victimize a horizontal competitor. 38 In-
stead, it victimizes potential players. In this sense, the draft is compa-
rable to a vertical restraint. Although the Supreme Court has held that
vertical price-fixing agreements are per se illegal,39 the Court has indi-
cated that not all vertical restraints will be subjected to the per se
standard.'
Third, the basic purpose of the antitrust laws is to protect competi-
tion in the product market.4' Yet, the draft restrains competition in the
labor market, not in the product market. In fact, to the extent that the
34. United States v. National Football League 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
35. 593 F.2d at 1179.
36. See, e.g., Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 619 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S.
801 (1977) (noting "joint venture" characteristics of NFL); L. A. Sullivan, supra note 15, at
251-52; Note, The Super Bowl and Sherman Act." Professional Team Sports and the Anti-trust
Laws, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 418, 419-21 (1967); Cf. Levin v. National Basketball Ass'n, 385 F.
Supp. 149, 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (noting "joint venture" characteristics of NBA); San Fran-
cisco Seals v. National Hockey League, 379 F. Supp. 966, 969 (C.D. Cal. 1974) (noting "joint
venture" characteristics of NHL). Cited from 593 F.2d at 1179. See also 593 F.2d at 1179-
81, 1187; 116 F. Supp. at 323. 116 F. Supp. at 323.
37. See, e.g., San Francisco Seals, Ltd. v. National Hockey League, 379 F. Supp. 966
(C.D. Cal. 1974); Levin v. National Basketball Ass'n, 385 F. Supp. 149 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). See
also Bork, Ancillary Restraints and the Sherman Act, 15 ABA Antitrust Section 211, 231-34
(1959); Morris, In the Wake of the Flood, 38 Law & Contemp. Prob. 85, 90 (1973); Neale,
The Peculiar Economics of Professional Sports, 78 Q.J. Econ. 1, 4-5 (1964). Cited from Weis-
tart 692, supra note 3, at note 86.
38. See note 33 supra. See also The True Story of What Happens When the Big Kids Say,
"It's my football, and you'll eitherplay by my rules or you won'tplay at all" 55 Neb. L. Rev.
335, 344 (1976).
39. Vertical price fixing as well as horizontal price fixing is per se illegal. See, e.g.,
United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v.
John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
40. See, e.g., White Motor Co. v. United States 372 U.S. 253 (1963); United States v.
Arnold, Schwinn & Co. 388 U.S. 365 (1967). Cited in 15 Duq. L. Rev. 747, 753 (1977).
41. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956); Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). Cited in 41 Alb. L. Rev. 154, 158 (1977).
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draft does contribute to competitive balance, an argument could be
made that it actually helps preserve a viable product market at the ex-
pense of a free labor market. 2
The above differences suggest that it may be inappropriate to
classify the draft as a per se violation of the antitrust laws.4 3 In fact,
several additional factors suggest that the draft should be tested under
the rule of reason. These factors, discussed below, are also relevant to
the determination of reasonableness under the rule of reason standard.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE RULE OF REASON TO THE NFL DRAFT
The rule of reason was first articulated in Standard Oil Co. v.
United States" and later in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States."
Acknowledging that all agreements restrain trade to some extent, the
court in Chicago Board of Trade stated:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is
such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes com-
petition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy
competition. To determine that question the court must ordi-
narily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the
restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint
was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual
or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to
exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the pur-
pose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.'
Application of the rule of reason involves a two step inquiry.
First, there must be some justification for analyzing the restraint under
the rule of reason standard. For example, application of this standard
is appropriate where the court lacks sufficient experience with the re-
42. 41 ALB. L. REV. Alb. L. Rev. 154, 161 (1977).
43. The appellate court in Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., held that the NFL player draft
was not a per se illegal group boycott. The court noted that the draft differed from the
classic group boycott both because teams in the NFL are not competitors in an economic
sense and because teams do not combine to exclude competitors from their own level of the
market, 593 F.2d 1173, 1178-79 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Cf. Deesen v. Professional Golfers Ass'n,
358 F.2d 165, 170 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 846, (1966) (refusing to invoke boycott per
se rule against tournament entry restrictions where purpose was "not to destroy competition
but to foster it by maintaining a high quality of competition"). Cited from 593 F. 2d at 1179,
note 21. See also United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. where the Supreme Court held that joint
ventures are governed by the rule of reason and not the per se rule when found to have a
lawful business purpose, 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
44. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
45. 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
46. Id. at 238.
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straint in question,47 or where the particular restraint or industry being
scrutinized is unique. 8
Application of the rule of reason standard does not insure, how-
ever, that the restraint will be lawful. To be upheld under this stan-
dard, the restraint must still be reasonable. Thus, the rule of reason
also involves an inquiry into the reasonableness of the restraint. The
determination of reasonableness depends upon many factors, such as
the purpose and effect of the restraint. 9
These two inquiries are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The
factors or rationale used to justify application of the rule of reason
might also be relevant to the determination of reasonableness. These
factors, articulated by the court in Chicago Board of Trade, are dis-
cussed below.
A. Facts Peculiar to the Industry
Facts "peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied"50
are relevant not only to the determination of reasonableness under the
rule of reason standard,5 but also to the standard of review to be ap-
plied to the restraint in question. 2 Thus, in the antitrust cases involv-
ing player restraints, the League has attempted to avoid the per se
classification by emphasizing the unique nature and peculiar needs of
the NFL. 3
The League's arguments are not without merit. The teams in the
NFL have unique characteristics which distinguish them from firms in
other industries. 4 Teams do compete on the playing field. Yet, they
47. See supra note 25.
48. See supra note 26.
49. See supra note 46.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. In Kapp v. National Football League, the court decided that the per se rule was inap-
propriate due in part to the unique nature and purpose of sports league activities. 390 F.
Supp. 73, 81 (N.D. Cal. 1974). The appellate court in Mackey v. National Football League
also held the per se standard inapplicable due to the unique and novel business under con-
sideration. 543 F.2d 606, 619 (8th Cir. 1976).
53. Weistart, supra note 3, at 595. See Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d
606, 621 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977). In Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc.,
593 F.2d 1173 (D. C. Cir. 1978), the NFL made a similar argument in support of the player
draft, claiming that the draft "has the legitimate business purpose of promoting 'competitive
balance' and playing-field equality among the teams, producing better entertainment for the
public, higher salaries for the players, and increased financial security for the clubs." id. at
1186. Cited from Hobel, Application of the Labor Exemption After the Expiration of Collec-
tive Bargaining Agreements in Professional Sports, 57 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 164, note 9 (1982).
54. United States v. National Football League 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
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do not compete with each other in an economic sense.55 No team is
interested in driving another team out of business, for if the League
fails, no one team can survive.5 6 Because the product is jointly pro-
duced, 7 each team has a vital interest in both the financial success58
and the competitive quality59 of the other teams in the league. Thus,
teams in the NFL, unlike firms in other industries, are actually depen-
dent upon each other for their survival.' ° Since economic competition
among teams is neither an intended nor a desirable goal of professional
sports leagues, it is certainly arguable that courts should not mechani-
cally apply principles premised on that notion.6 '
B. Pro Competitive Benefits
The Chicago Board of Trade Court stated that "the true test of
legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and
perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may
suppress or even destroy competition. ' 62 Similarly, the Supreme Court
in National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States63 indi-
cated that the test of reasonableness under the rule of reason requires
that there be procompetitive economic benefits to offset the restraint's
anticompetitive effects.M
55. 593 F.2d at 1178-79.
56. Id. at 1179.
57. 593 F.2d at 1178-79.
58. 116 F. Supp. at 323. See also brief for defendants at 6, Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc.,
420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976). Cited from 15 Duq. L. Rev. 747, 748; (Sum. 1977) Mackey
v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), aff'g. 407 F. Supp. 1000 (D.
Minn. 1975); Comment, Super Bowl and the Sherman Act. Professional Team Sports and the
Antitrust Laws, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 418 (1967); 55 Neb. L. Rev. 335 (1976).
59. There is a direct correlation between fan interest (or gate receipts and television
revenues) and the unpredictability of the outcome of individual games and divisional races.
Demmert, Economics of Professional Team Sports 10-11 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Demmert].
60. 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
61. "The members of a league cannot compete in the way that members of other indus-
tries can. It is neither in the interests of the members of the league nor of the public gener-
ally that the more efficient teams should drive out the less efficient. If one team goes out of
business, all are endangered. This suggests that the concept of business competition may be
irrelevant as applied to the relationship between members of a league. Functionally, the
league appears to be a joint enterprise for the production of amusement spectacles." Bork,
Ancillary Restraints and the Sherman Act, 15 ABA Antitrust Section 211, 233 (1959). Cited
from Weistart, supra note 3, at 700, note 136.
62. See supra note 46.
63. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
64. The restraint in question in Professional Engineers was a provision in the Society's
canon of ethics that prohibited its members from submitting competing bids for engineering
services. The Society argued that the restraint was reasonable under the rule of reason be-
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The appellate court in Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc. ,65 applying a test
similar to the one adopted in Professional Engineers, stated that:
[A] player draft can survive scrutiny under the rule of reason
only if it is demonstrated to have positive economically
procompetitive benefits that offset its anticompetitive effects,
or, at the least, if it is demonstrated to accomplish legitimate
business purposes and to have a net anticompetitive effect that
is insubstantial.66
In strict economic terms, the court felt that the draft had no demon-
strated procompetitive effects.6 7 As a result, the court concluded that
the draft was an unreasonable restraint of trade.6"
In a very narrow sense, the court's analysis was correct. Although
the draft does promote competition on the playing field, it does not
increase economic competition among teams.69 For instance, the teams
do not compete in the same market for fans.7° Also, the teams share
revenues made from television and their gate receipts. 7' Thus, eco-
nomic procompetitive benefits are not felt by one team at the expense
of another.
Yet, in another sense, the draft does produce economic procompe-
titive benefits. In other business settings, firms that attempt to improve
the quality of their product do so in order to compete more effectively
with other firms in the industry. The product in the NFL is jointly
produced 72 and, thus, the quality of this product depends upon the
quality of all the teams in the League. It is arguable that the draft, by
improving the competitive equality of the teams in the League, im-
proves the quality of NFL football. Thus, the economic procompeti-
tive benefits produced by the draft accrue to all teams. Improving the
quality of NFL football enables the League as a whole to compete
cause its purpose was to minimize the risk that competition would produce inferior engi-
neering work. This defense failed primarily because the court found no economic benefits to
offset the anticompetitive effects of the ban on competitive bidding. The court felt that the
benefits of public safety were nonecomic. 435 U.S. at 696 note 22.
65. 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
66. 593 F.2d at 1188-89.
67. Id. at 1186. The court apparently held that the benefits of the NFL draft were com-
parable to the noneconomic benefits of public safety.
68. Id. at 1186-87.
69. Id. at 1178-79.
70. Potential exceptions to this statement, such as the Oakland Raiders and San Fran-
cisco Forty-Niners or the New York Jets and the New York Giants, exist only because the
N.F.L. has determined that the local market involved can support two franchises. Cited
from 27 Clev. St. L. Rev. 541, 557 (1978).,
71. See National Football League Collective Bargaining Agreement (1977).
72. 593 F.2d at 1178-79.
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more effectively with other sports Leagues and other forms of en-
tertainment for consumer dollars."
Addressing the issue of whether the draft produces economic
procompetitive benefits, the Smith court focused on the beneficial effect
that the draft had on the teams within the League. Because there is no
economic competition between the teams in the NFL, the court was
unable to find any economic procompetitive benefits. Yet the court in
Smith did not directly address the issue of whether the NFL could real-
ize from the draft economic procompetitive benefits vis a vis other
forms of entertainment. The determination of this issue by a future
court would depend on that court's perception of the League as either a
single entity or twenty-eight separate entities and the extent to which
the draft actually equalizes competitive balance.
C Purpose of the Restraint
The determination of reasonableness also depends upon the pur-
pose of the restraint."4 The alleged purpose of the draft is to help main-
tain the financial viability of the League.75 It has been shown that
there is a direct correlation between fan interest (or revenues) and the
unpredictability of the outcome of individual games and divisional
races. 6 The League argues that mechanisms, such as the draft, that
help equalize team strengths and maintain competitive balance, help
maintain fan interest and are thus essential to the League's survival.77
A legitimate purpose, however, will not necessarily validate an
otherwise unlawful restraint. At the very least, the restraint must also
contribute to the realization of its stated purpose. 78 Thus, considera-
tion is also given to the actual or probable effects of the restraint.79
D. Actual Effect of the Restraint
The legality of the NFL draft was considered in Smith v. Pro Foot-
73. This idea was discussed in 27 Clev. St. L. Rev. 541, 557-558 (1978).
74. See supra note 46. See also Weistart, supra note 3, at 592-93.
75. Demmert, supra note 59, at 31-33. See also Weistart, supra note 3, at 597.
76. Id. at 10-11.
77. Demmert, supra note 59, at 31-33; Weistart, supra note 3, at 597. See also brief for
defendants at 20, Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976).
78. See, e.g., Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 292 (1963); Mackey v. Na-
tional Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. United States Trotting
Ass'n, 1960 Trade Cas. § 69, 761 (S. D. Ohio). See also Comment, Trade Association Exclu-
sionary Practices: An Afflrmative Rolefor the Rule ofReason, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 1486 (1966).
Cited from Weistart, supra note 3, at 691, note 75.
79. See supra note 46.
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ball Inc. " The court's analysis in that case suggested that the factual
information necessary to evaluate the effects of the draft had not been
gathered. Addressing the claim that the draft had an impact on com-
petitive balance, the court noted that in the three prior seasons 22 of 24
of the play-off slots had been earned by only nine teams."' This fact
merely indicated that certain teams were able to maintain their compet-
itive superiority over the three-year period despite the draft. The opin-
ion contained no evidence to suggest that this observation could be
correlated in any way to the actual impact of the draft on team per-
formances. In fact, based on the evidence presented, it appears that the
court was unable to isolate the actual impact of the draft. Perhaps
more significant was the absence of any attempt by the court to deter-
mine the degree of impact necessary to conclude that the draft effec-
tively helps balance team strengths.
A recent statistical study 2 indicates that while the draft system
does have some impact on the change in comparative team strengths,
much of the change is not explained by the draft. Unfortunately, the
Smith court failed to articulate a standard under which the effects of
the draft could be analyzed. Yet, the results of the study question
whether the impact of the draft is substantial enough to enable a court
to conclude that the draft effectively balances team strengths.
E. Availability of a Less Restrictive Alternative
A restraint that has a legitimate purpose, is effective, and produces
procompetitive benefits will not automatically be reasonable. The
Court in Chicago Board of Trade also articulated a concern for "the
nature of the restraint."8 3 In somewhat more specific terms, other
courts have suggested that a restraint, to be reasonable, must also be
the "least restrictive" device available to accomplish the legitimate
objective."
Admittedly, the soundness of an absolute "least restrictive alterna-
80. 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976), aj7'd, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
81. 420 F. Supp. at 746 (1976). Cited from New York Times, June 6, 1976, p. S6, "NFL
Owners Will Take Cut in Player Limit."
82. Lock and Gratz, A Legal and Statistical Analysis of the National Football League
Player Draft- Chicago, New York, Detroit, It's All the Same Pick, 2 Loy. L.A. Ent. L.J. 47
1982.
83. See supra note 46.
84. 420 F. Supp. at 747. See also Copper Liquors, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 506 F.2d
934, 945 (5th Cir. 1975); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 51 (9th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972). See generally Robinson, Recent Antitrust Developments: 1975,
76 COLUM. L. REV. 191, 231-33 (1976). Cited from Weistart, supra note 3, at 628.
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tive" approach is questionable. Such an approach theoretically exposes
otherwise reasonable restraints to attack by anyone sufficiently inven-
tive to devise even slightly less restrictive alternatives."5 The availabil-
ity of less restrictive alternatives is clearly relevant. Yet, the court in
American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc. 86 did not feel that the
existence of an alternative was alone determinative of a restraint's
reasonableness:
[Tihe Supreme Court has never indicated that, regardless of
the other circumstances present, the availability of an alterna-
tive means of achieving the asserted business purpose renders
the existing arrangement unlawful if that alternative would be
less restrictive of competition no matter to how small a
degree.
8 7
The court went on to suggest that the appropriate focus was whether
the device implemented exceeded "the outer limits of restraint reason-
ably necessary to protect the defendant."8 8 In other words, the court
seemed more concerned with whether the restraint was actually reason-
able than with whether a less restrictive alternative was available.
The relevance of less restrictive alternatives was also discussed in
Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc. 9 The court in that case concluded that the
NFL draft, because it was significantly more restrictive than necessary,
would be unreasonable if analyzed under the rule of reason.90 To sup-
port its view that the draft was overly restrictive, the court offered two
examples of less restrictive alternatives.9 1
The Smith court did not actually state that the draft would be up-




88. Id. at 1248-49, quoting, Walt Disney Productions v. American Broadcasting-Para-
mount Theatres, 180 F. Supp. 113, 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
89. 420 F. Supp. at 746-47.
90. Id. at 746.
91. Id. at 747. First, the draft system could be made less restrictive simply by reducing
the number of rounds of the draft. This alternative should reduce the number of players
affected by the draft. The evidence presented to the court indicated that each year there are
approximately sixty players "who will almost certainly make the team and have a good
chance of making the starting lineup in their first year." Thus, the court noted that a draft
consisting of two rounds would distribute the most talented players of, in other words, those
that had an actual impact on competitive balance. Additional evidence suggested that team
scouting and coaching staffs were able to identify most of these players.
The court suggested that the draft could also be made less restrictive by allowing each
player to be drafted by more than one team. This alternative would create "more of a free
market system for determining new players' salaries."
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held only if it was the least restrictive method available to achieve the
league's stated goal. It did suggest, however, that the availability of less
restrictive alternatives was an important factor in determining the rea-
sonableness of the draft under the rule of reason standard:
[I]n light of the near certainty that less restrictive alternatives
are available to meet the alleged player distribution needs of
the league, the current system cannot be regarded as "reason-
able" within the meaning of the antitrust laws.
92
This language seems to imply that the existence of a less restrictive
alternative renders a restraint unreasonable. Yet, such a rule would be
indistinguishable from the least restrictive alternative approach. A less
restrictive alternative would exist in all cases except where the restraint
in question was the least restrictive one available. It is not at all clear
that the court endorsed such a rigid test. In fact, the court did not even
consider whether there were alternatives less restrictive than the draft
available to achieve competitive balance. The court seemed to imply
that the draft, if it were used by the League, should be no more restric-
tive than necessary to realize that goal. Scheduling, another mecha-
nism used to promote competitive balance, is discussed in the following
section.
V. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF SCHEDULING ON
TEAM PERFORMANCE
A. Introduction
As discussed above, the viability of the NFL depends upon its
ability to stage games in which teams are sufficiently evenly matched so
that the result of a particular game is not preordained.93 Thus, the
League has adopted various mechanisms to promote the equalization
of team strengths.
Certain mechanisms, such as the Rozelle Rule,94 were designed to
prevent individual teams from accumulating too much talent or becom-
ing too strong. Other restraints are designed to enable the weaker
teams to improve themselves each year in relation to the better teams.
For example, the NFL conducts a draft each year through which teams
select new players who have not previously signed professional con-
92. Id.
93. Demmert, supra note 59, at 10-11, 15-18. Cited from Weistart, supra note 3, at 697.
94. The Rozelle Rule required any club signing a free agent to compensate the free
agent's original employer. CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS FOR THE NATIONAL
FOOTBALL LEAGUE, article 12.1 (H).
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tracts. 95 Teams exercise draft rights in reverse order of their playing
records so that the team with the worst record receives the first selection
in each round of the draft. In theory, this system reduces the disparity
in quality among the teams in the League.
96
Scheduling, another mechanism used by the League to promote
competitive balance, 97 appears to be a legitimate method to help the
NFL stage unpredictable games and divisional races. Unlike the vari-
ous player restraints employed by the NFL, scheduling does not ad-
versely affect player salaries and player mobility and, thus, does not
appear to conflict with the antitrust laws. For this reason, the League
should attempt to devise a scheduling format that would, given other
constraints, have as great an impact on competitive balance as possible.
Adopting such a format would reduce the necessity of relying on player
restraints to equalize team strengths.
The statistical study below analyzes the impact of schedule
strength on team performance in the NFL. The study first describes
the current scheduling format employed by the NFL and compares the
impact of scheduling on team performances for the four year periods
before and after this format was adopted. The results of the study indi-
cate that the current scheduling format has had no greater impact on
changes in team performances than the prior system used by the League.
An alternative format is then proposed. This alternative would mini-
mize the difference in winning percentages of all non-divisional games
and presumably increase the impact of scheduling on team
performances.
B. Current Scheduling Format
Unlike the draft system, scheduling does not directly reduce dis-
parities in team strengths. The current scheduling format, adopted in
1978,98 is, however, ostensibly designed to reduce disparities in team
winning percentages.
95. National Football League Collective Bargaining Agreement, Article XIII, § 4 (1977).
96. Presumably, this gives the weaker teams a greater opportunity for improvement.
The advantages that a weak team receives from its selection priority in the draft, however,
does not insure that that team will actually realize any significant improvement. Not all
teams have equal managerial and scouting capabilities. These skills have an impact on both
a team's performance and its draft selections and could conceivably neutralize the advan-
tage/disadvantage gained by its selection priority in the draft. As a result, this system does
not guarantee that the weaker teams will utilize their selection priorities to select better play-
ers than those selected by stronger teams.
97. National Football League 1981 Media Information Book at 8.
98. Id.
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A team's schedule is composed of both divisional and non-divi-
sional opponents. Since the merger in 1970 between the American
Football League and the National Football League, each team has au-
tomatically played each of its divisional opponents twice. Prior to
1978, however, the NFL employed a system of rotating opponents over
the years to determine the non-divisional portion of team schedules.99
This system frequently resulted in scheduling inequities. For example,
in 1975, the New York Giants had the worst record in the League. The
following year, the opponents on their schedule had a higher cumula-
tive winning percentage than the opponents of any other team."
Beginning in 1978, the League adopted a new scheduling format
ostensibly designed to provide for both competitive equality and a vari-
ety of opponents.' This format is still used by the League. Under this
system, team divisional standings at the conclusion of one season are
used as the primary guide for determining the non-divisional portion of
team schedules for the upcoming season. 02
As Table 1103 illustrates, the current format primarily benefits the
last place teams in those divisions that have five teams. (Four divisions
have five teams; the other two divisions have four teams.) This is be-
cause the current format confers no benefits on the last place team in
the four-team divisions. The main difference in the schedules of the
remaining 24 teams is that the first and fourth place teams each play
four of their non-divisional games against the first and fourth place
teams in two other divisions while the second and third place teams
play four games against second and third place teams.
99. Rozefle, National Football League Game Plan '78 at i.
100. Id.
101. National Football League 1981 Media Information Book at 8.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 9.
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TABLE 1
1982 Opponent Breakdown Based on 1981 Standings
AE AC AW NE NC NW
AFC EAST AFC CENRAL AFC WEST NFC EASr NFC CENTRAL NFC WEST
AE-I NC-I NC-2 AC-I NE-I NE-2 AW-I NW-I NW-2 NE-I AC-I AC-2 NC-I AE-I AE-2 NW-I AW-I AW-2
NC-3 NC-4 NE-3 NE.4 NW-3 NW-4 AC-3 AC-4 AE-3 AE-4 AW-3 AW-4
AC-4 AC-I AE-I AE-4 AE-4 AE-I NW-4 NW-I NE-4 NE-I NE-I NE-4
AW-I AW-4 AW-4 AW-I AC-I AC-4 NC-I NC-4 NW-I NW-4 NC-4 NC-I
AW-4 AE-5 NC-S NE-5
AE-2 NC-I NC-2 AC-i NE-I NE-2 AW-2 NW-I NW-i NE-2 AC-I AC-2 NC-2 AE-I AE-2 NW-2 AW-I AW-2
NC-3 NC-4 NE-3 NE-4 NW-3 NW-4 AC-3 AC4 AE-3 AE-4 AW-3 AW-4
AC-3 AC-2 AE-2 AE-3 AE-3 AE-2 NW-3 NW-2 NE-3 NE-2 NE-2 NE-3
AW-2 AW-i AW-3 AW-2 AC-2 AC-3 NC-2 NC-3 NW-2 NW-3 NC-3 NC-2
AE-5 AW-5 NE-5 NC-5
Ai NC-I NC-2 AC-i NE-I NE-2 AW-3 NW-I NW-2 NE-3 AC-I AC-2 NC-3 AE-I AE-2 NW-3 AW-I AW-2
NC-3 NC4 NE-3 NE4 NW-3 NW-4 AC-3 AC-4 AE-3 AE-4 AW-3 AW-4
AC-2 AC-i A-3 AE-2 AE-2 AE-3 NW-2 NW-3 NE-2 NE-3 NE-3 NE-2
AW-3 AW-2 AW-2 AW-3 AC-3 AC-2 NC-3 NC-2 NW-3 NW-2 NC-2 NC-3
AW-5 AE-5 NC-5 NE-5
AE-4 NC-I NC-2 AC=4 NE-I NE-2 AW4 NW-I NW-2 NE-4 AC-I AC-2 NC-4 AE-I AE-2 NW4 AW-I AW-2
NC-3 NC-4 NE-3 NE-4 NW-3 NW-4 AC-3 AC-4 AE-3 AE-4 AW-3 AW4
AC-I AC-4 AE-4 AE-I AE-I AE-4 NW-I NW-4 NE-I NE-4 NE-4 NE-I
AW-4 AW-I AW-I AW-4 AC-4 AC-I NC.4 NC-I NW-4 NW-I NC-I NC-4
AE-4 AW-S NE-5 NC-5
A9-6 AC-I AC-2 AW-S AC-2 AC-I NE-S NW-I NW-2 NC-S NW-2 NW-I
AC-3 AC-4 AC-4 AC-3 NW-3 NW-4 NW-4 NW-3
AW-5 AW-5 AC-5 AC-5 NC-5 NC-S NE-5 NE-5
NE-5 NC-5 NC-S NE-5 AW-5 AW-5 AE-5 AW-5
Note: The abbreviatiom in the above chat are explained by the individual clumn headinp For example, AE stands for AFC
EAn, NE stands for NFC EAst ae
Although some of these 24 teams actually will have more difficult
schedules than others, the current format structurally produces 24
schedules of roughly comparable difficulty. The four fifth place teams,
on the other hand, receives schedules which are structurally much less
difficult. Five out of eight of their non-divisional opponents are last
place teams.
The significance of the advantage given to fifth place finishers can
be illustrated by the situation that existed between the Baltimore Colts
and the New England Patriots at the conclusion of the 1981 season.
The two AFC Eastern division teams finished with 2-12 records, the
worst records in the League. Because of its winning percentage and the
League tie breaking procedure, New England received the first selec-
tion in the 1982 college draft and a fifth place finish in the AFC East.
The Colts received the second selection in the draft and a fourth place
finish.
The advantage that a team selecting first in the draft gains over a
team selecting second is difficult to measure. Less difficult to measure,
however, is the schedule advantage that a fifth place team gains over a
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fourth place team. The Patriots, by finishing fifth in the AFC Eastern
division, were scheduled to play the fifth place team in the AFC West
twice, the fifth place teams in the NFC East and NFC Central and the
four teams in the AFC Central. The Colts, by finishing fourth, were
scheduled to play the top four finishers in the NFC Central, the first
and fourth place teams in the AFC Central and the first and fourth
place teams in AFC West.
The League is ostensibly using scheduling to promote competitive
balance. The above example illustrates that, despite the League's in-
tentions, the current scheduling format, like the old format, produces
inequities. The following stuay attempts to determine whether the cur-
rent format has had a greater impact on team performances than the
prior format.
C Statistical Analysis
The purposes of this analysis is to determine the relationship be-
tween the strength of a team's schedule and the change in that team's
winning percentage. A comparative analysis is performed on the four
year period immediately preceding the adoption of the current schedul-
ing format (1974 through 1977) and the four year period after its adop-
tion (1978 through 1981) to determine if the current format has had a
greater impact on team performances than the previous system em-
ployed by the League.
The cumulative year t records of a team's year t opponents and the
cumulative year t-1 records of a team's year t opponents were used to
estimate the actual strength of a team's schedule."° The cumulative
year t records of year t opponents theoretically provides the closest and
most current measure of schedule difficulty for each team. This meas-
ure should more accurately represent the strength of a team's oppo-
nents in year t since it contains personnel changes between year t- 1 and
year t due to the draft, trades, free agency and injuries. Unfortunately,
104. Admittedly, the winning percentage and strength measure are two different team
characteristics. Team winning percentage does not totally reflect team strengths and vice-
versa. Because each team plays a different set of opponents, winning percentages is not a
perfect indicator of relative strength. For example, two teams could compile identical win-
ning percentages but not possess identical strength. One team could have compiled a win-
ning percentage against a more difficult set of opponents. In addition, a team does not
perform at a consistent level of strength each week. Therefore, on any given Sunday an
opponent's strength will not necessarily be reflected in its winning percentage. Theoreti-
cally, however, there is a strong correlation between the two measures. As a result, the
cummulative winning percentage of a team's opponents was used in the study below to
approximate the strength of that team's schedule.
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results of the year t season occur after the year t schedule is planned.
The league cannot control year t records so, as input for scheduling
decisions, they must estimate the year t quality of all teams before the
season.
Team records in year t-1 are the most current information and,
thus, the best estimate available to the League to predict the quality of
teams in year t. Thus, it is this year t- I information that must be used
to help determine the NFL schedule in year t. Scheduling, as a mecha-
nism to equalize competition, is important only to the extent that it can
be controlled by the League. For this reason, in the analysis below, the
strength of a team's schedule is measured by the prior year (t-1) per-
formances of its opponents. °O
Data were collected for the eight year period from 1974 through
1981. The data set was divided into two groups; the time periods be-
tween 1974 - 1977 and 1978 - 1981. Two variables were used for each
time period to approximate the strength of a team's year t opponents.
The first variable represents the strength of a team's entire schedule,
both divisional and non-divisional opponents. The second variable
represents the strength of the non-divisional portion of a team's
schedule. "
The relationship between schedule difficulty (as measured by the
year t-1 records of a team's year t opponents) and the one year change
105. The year t schedule strength measure, although not discussed below, was also ana-
lyzed. The simple correlation between the year t-I and year t records of all opponents is
.5558 for the period 1974 through 1981. For the same period, the simple correlate in be-
tween year t-I and year t records of non-divisional opponents is .6203. Statistically, these
values imply a very significant positive relationship. Thus, the impact of year t- I records is a
reasonable approximation of the impact of year t records.
It should also be noted that in the study, the actual measure of schedule strength is
represented by the cummulative year t- I winning percentage of a team's year t opponents
less the games played against that particular team in year t-I. For example, in 1976, the
New Orleans Saints were 4-10 overall and 0-2 against the San Francisco 49ers. When total-
ing the winning percentage of San Francisco's 1976 opponents to determine the strength of
its 1977 schedule, those two games were subtracted from the Saints' overall record so that
New Orleans was counted as 4-8. The impact that San Francisco's 1977 schedule had on its
1977 winning percentage was determined by the relationship between the cummulative 1976
winning percentage of its opponents and its own winning percentage in 1976 and 1977.
Since some of a team's 1977 opponents will also have been opponents in 1976, the cummula-
tive 1976 winning percentage of its 1977 opponents will contain some games that are also
included in that team's own 1976 winning percentage. These games were subtracted out to
avoid double counting.
106. Because teams play their divisional opponents twice under both the new and old
scheduling formats, a comparison of the impact of divisional opponents on team perform-
ance before and after 1978 was less meaningful. Therefore, a separate variable representing
the strength of divisional opponents was not used. The strength of a team's divisional oppo-
nents is included in the first variable.
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in team strength was of primary interest. Simple correlations between
those variables representing schedule strength and the variable repre-
senting change in team strength were compared for the time periods
before and after 1978. A 95% confidence interval was calculated on
each of the correlations to test various hypotheses. The results are




1974- 1977 1978 - 1981
r,* -. 0439 -. 1005
95%
confidence (-.235, .15) (-.28, .087)
interval on
r,
*rj is the coefficient of correlation between the change in a team's winning per-
centage from year t to year t+ 1 and the year t winning percentage of that team's
year t+l divisional and nondivisional opponent.
TABLE 3
Non-divisional Opponents
1974- 1977 1978- 1981
r2** -. 2199 -. 3407
95%
confidence (-.395, .03) (-.495, .165)
interval on
r2
**r2 is the coefficient of correlation between the change in a team's winning per-
centage from year t to year t+ I and the year t winning percentage of that team's
year t+l non-divisional opponents.
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Each of these bar graphs represent a 95%
confidence interval placed on the simple
correlation between a scheduling variable
(e.g. the records of all opponents before 1978)
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TABLE 5

























Each of these bar graphs represent a 95%
confidence interval placed on the simple
correlation between a scheduling variable
(e.g. the records of all opponents before 1978)
and a one year change in winning percentage.
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D. Summary of Results
The confidence intervals were used to test two things. First, they
test whether the impact of scheduling on one year changes in team per-
formance is significantly different from zero. Second, the intervals test
whether the correlation between schedule strength and the change in
team perrformance is significantly different for the two time periods.
The confidence interval on r, includes the value zero for both time
periods and, as a result, the hypothesis r, = 0 cannot be rejected. Thus,
a claim that the impact of a team's entire schedule on changes in win-
ning percentage is significantly different from zero cannot be substanti-
ated statistically. In addition, the r, for 1974-1977 and the r, for 1978-
1981 fall within each others confidence intervals. This means that the
hypothesis ri for 1974-1977 = r , for 1978-1981 cannot be rejected and,
therefore, a claim that the current scheduling format has a greater im-
pact on changes on team performance than the prior scheduling system
cannot be substantiated.
As the table indicates, the value zero is not contained in either
confidence interval on r2, the coefficient of correlation between change
in winning percentage and the strength of a team's non-divisional op-
ponents. Since the hypothesis r2 = 0 can be rejected for both time peri-
ods, the impact of the non-divisional portion of team schedules is
significantly different from zero, both before and after the current
scheduling format was adopted. However, the r2 for 1974 - 1977 and
the r2 for 1978-1981 fall within each other's confidence interval. Thus,
the hypothesis r2 (1974-1977) = r 2 (1978-1981) cannot be rejected. This
means that there is no statistical evidence that the current scheduling
format has had any greater impact on changes in team performance
than the prior system used by the League.
While it cannot be shown that the schedule variable that includes
both divisional and non-divisional opponents has had a significant im-
pact on changes in team performance, the schedule variable that in-
cludes only non-divisional opponents has had an impact on scheduling
that is significantly different than zero. This would suggest that the
actual impact of the non-divisional portion of team schedules is to
some extent neutralized by the strength of entire team schedules. In
addition, the results in the table indicate that the current scheduling
format has had no greater impact on team performance than the prior
system. Thus, although the League has articulated that the current for-
mat is designed to provide for competitive equality, this goal is not
being realized.
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E. Alternatives
If the League intends to use scheduling as a mechanism to increase
the unpredictability of games and divisional races, it should investigate
the possibility of adapting a different, more effective system. 07 The
divisional portion of team schedules appears to neutralize the impact of
non-divisional schedules. One alternative would be to change the cur-
rent divisional format so that teams do not necessarily play divisional
opponents twice each year. Because of intra-divisional rivalries, home
and away scheduling for divisional games, and the League's current
divisional tie breaking procedures, this alternative would require a ma-
jor shift in both the League's philosophy and current procedures.
A less drastic change would involve non-divisional scheduling.
The current format schedules non-divisional opponents according to
divisional standings. As discussed above, this system has little impact
on all but the four fifth place teams and is particularly ineffective where
the two weakest teams, as the Patriots and Colts were in 1982, are in the
same division.
A more effective system would schedule non-divisional opponents
according to winning percentage, regardless of a team's divisional
standing. Teams would be ranked by winning percentage and the team
with the lowest winning percentage would receive a non-divisional
schedule composed of opponents with a lower cumulative winning per-
centage than any other team's non-divisional opponents. The team
with the second lowest winning percentage would receive the second
weakest non-divisional schedule. A system of this nature would mini-
mize the differences in winning percentages among all non-divisional
opponents. A relatively simple math programming model to design
team schedules with this objective is explained in Appendix A.
107. It should be noted that the number of non-Sunday games scheduled each year is an
additional aspect of the scheduling mechanism controlled by the League. A detailed analy-
sis of the non-Sunday games variable was not conducted in this study. This variable may
have an impact on team performance. Playing non-Sunday games could disrupt a team's
rhythm by reducing and expanding the number of preparation days before games. Each
week during the NFL season, the League schedules one Monday night game and occasional
Thursday and Saturday games. There is no evidence to suggest that the League is con-
sciously using this variable to reduce the disparities in team winning percentages. Incorpo-
rating this variable into a scheduling format in a systematic manner might help achieve this
goal. For the period 1974 through 1981, the simple correlation between the number of non-
Sunday games played and the one year change in winning percentage was significant
(-.3998). However, the number of non-Sunday games is highly correlated with the other
schedule variables used in the study (such as strength of non-divisional opponents and
strength of divisional opponents). Additional analysis would be required to separate the
exact impact of non-Sunday games from the impact of the other schedule variables.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Scheduling, unlike the NFL player draft and other player re-
straints, does not conffict with the antitrust laws. For this reason,
scheduling is an appropriate device through which the league can help
insure the unpredictability of individual games and divisional races.
The NFL has articulated that the current scheduling format is designed
to provide for competitive equality. Yet, the above analysis suggests
that the current scheduling format has had no greater impact on com-
petitive equality than the prior system. The League should consider a
new format, such as the one explained in the model in Appendix A.




Xijkm --= whether team i plays teamj in week k at location m.
(Zero-One Variables)
i = 1, 2.....28S= 1, 2,.. .,28 for all i < j onlyj = 1, 2,..... 28
k = 1, 2,..., 16
m = home (1), away (2)
(e.g. If X 1 211 = 1, it means team 1 should play team 2
during the first week of the season at team l's home
location.)
OBJECTIVE FUNCTION:
The objective function should sum the variables that represent
non-divisional games. Each of these variables has a coefficient that
measures the difference between the two opponent's winning percent-
ages from the previous year (Di).
5 28 16 2M in Z z- Y 1 7 Dii Xijkm, +l + l
i=l j=6 k=l m=l
23 28 16 2
S2: Y 1 Y Dij Xijkm
i=20 j=24 k= I m=l
CONSTRAINTS:
(I) Each team plays one game each week.
28 2
(e.g. 1 7 Xljlm = 1)
j=2 m=l
(2) Each team plays each divisional opponent twice (home
and away) during the season.
16 16




(3) Each team cannot play the same non-divisional oppo-
nent more than once.
16 2(e.g. x 1 X I6km 1
k=l m=l
(4) Each team plays half the non-divisional games at home
- half away.
28 16 28 16
(e.g. 1 7 Xljkl = F1, x 7 Xljk2 = F,
j=6 k=l j=6 k=l
where F, = the number of non-divisional games team 1
must play at home or away.)
COMMENTS:
(1) Various other restrictions could be incorporated:
(a) Stadium conflicts
(b) Not more than X number of consecutive home
(away) games during the season.
(c) Eliminate extreme mis-matches or guarantee cer-
tain evenly matched contests.
(2) Each year the coefficients in the objedve function
would be up-dated to reflect the most recent season.
The rest of the model would not change from year to
year.
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